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Abstract 
A decade after the global financial crisis, the task of building a financial stability policy 
framework has unfinished business. Fundamental questions about the goal of financial 
stability and the policies to achieve it were sidelined by the excessive focus on the 
minutiae of macroprudential policy. Increased responsibilities were given to central 
banks without a proper discussion about the right degree of delegation and 
accountability. A comprehensive framework for financial stability should have three 
pillars: macroprudential policy, microprudential supervision, and financial safety nets. 
Sufficient operational independence should be given to the agency(ies) responsible for 
financial stability but determining the goal, institutional architecture, and agency 
assignments, resolving any policy tradeoffs, and ensuring accountability should be a 
political responsibility. Even with the best framework, however, given the variety of 
structural, behavioral, and political economy factors affecting financial stability and our 
limited understanding of the financial system, securing this goal will remain a challenge. 
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Introduction 
Traditional policy frameworks that rely on fiscal and monetary policies and 
microprudential regulation of the financial system failed to contain the risks that led 
to the global financial crisis a decade ago. In his now classic 2008 intervention, U.S. 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke called for ‘widening the field of vision’ of 
policy-makers and regulators to incorporate a system-wide perspective, in order to 
identify and mitigate all potential sources of financial instability (Bernanke 2008).  
In the years following the crisis, major financial regulatory reforms were launched to 
address the exposed fault lines. The political impetus was provided by the G20. The 
Financial Stability Board (FSB)—created for this purpose out of the Financial Stability 
Forum—was tasked with coordinating these reforms globally and monitoring their 
implementation. These reforms included, among others, deep changes in sectoral 
regulations (notably for banks), new or revised global supervisory standards, structural 
measures to end ‘too-big-to-fail’ and lower the cost of resolving failing or failed 
financial institutions, and reforms in OTC derivatives markets (for a comprehensive 
account of the reform agenda and latest status of implementation, see FSB 2018). They 
also, crucially, included establishing a new ‘macroprudential’ policy framework 
explicitly aimed at the stability of the financial system as a whole, in order to translate 
Bernanke’s ‘wider field of vision’ into concrete policies. 
Today, a decade after the crisis, and after a few wrong turns, this last part of the 
project is still unfinished. Despite the technical advances in defining the tasks and 
toolkit of this new macroprudential policy, fundamental questions remain about the 
ultimate goal—financial stability—and how it can be achieved. In the words of 
Sir Andrew Large, former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, too much of the 
debate so far ‘relates to details and technical features [while] much less attention has 
been paid to viewing the subject [of financial stability] top down and examining how 
the various difficult areas hang together’ (Large 2015).  
Moreover, in many cases, the mandate for macroprudential policy was given to central 
banks—or, at any rate, resulted in a major expansion of the powers of central banks—
without a proper discussion about governance and accountability. Central bankers, 
supported by the IMF, seemed to presume that their new responsibilities should come 
with the same degree of independence as monetary policy—independence that they 
were keen to preserve at all costs. Against this background, the recent backlash 
against central banks in the US, the UK, the euro area and elsewhere on the grounds 
that they have become too powerful and unaccountable should not have come entirely 
as a surprise. To be sure, this backlash reflects concerns not only about their new 
financial stability responsibilities but also about their conduct of monetary policy. 
Still, it is a useful reminder of the risks of hubris.  
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As memories of the crisis fade, the political momentum behind the reforms weakens. 
Before the next turn of the financial cycle puts the financial stability policy framework 
to the test, it is important to finish the unfinished business and get it right. This essay 
attempts to make a contribution to this task. The next section provides a brief 
overview of the evolution of the financial stability policy in the post-crisis period. The 
third section tackles the three ‘big’ foundational questions: the goal, boundaries, and 
governance of financial stability policy. And the final section offers some concluding 
observations. 
The evolution of financial stability policy post-crisis 
Before the global financial crisis, prudential supervision was supposed to ensure the 
safety and soundness of financial institutions. Even at that time, it was understood 
that focusing on individual institutions was not sufficient to ensure the stability of the 
system as a whole and an additional ‘macroprudential’ perspective was necessary 
(Crockett 2000).1 It was also understood that other policies, especially monetary 
policy, could create financial stability risks (for example, when interest rates are held 
too low for too long). There was indeed a vigorous debate during the period of the 
‘Great Moderation’ in the early 2000s on whether monetary policy should be used to 
tame asset price booms. But the prevailing consensus was that monetary policy should 
stick to its inflation objective and that prudential supervision, aided by market 
discipline and ideally incorporating both a micro- and a macro- perspective, would be 
sufficient to maintain the stability of the financial system.  
This consensus was shattered by the crisis. Prudential supervision and market 
discipline were no longer sufficient to deliver systemic stability. What was needed was 
a separate, totally new policy framework for monitoring and mitigating systemic risk 
in the financial system. This was the task of macroprudential policy. 
Initially, macroprudential policy was defined narrowly by the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) as ‘the use of prudential tools with the explicit objective of 
promoting the stability of the financial system as a whole, not necessarily of the 
individual financial institutions’ (Caruana 2010). The BIS stressed that 
macroprudential policy alone would be incapable of achieving its objective without 
the support of other policies: financial stability was a shared responsibility. It also 
cautioned against unrealistic expectations and warned of the risk of mission creep: ‘the 
word macroprudential is becoming very popular, and we run the risk of using 
“macroprudential” as a catch-all term to cover all manner of policies. I think we should 
                                                 
1 Indeed, the term ‘macroprudential’ had been in use since the late 1970s to signify an approach to 
supervision that ‘considers problems that bear upon the market as a whole as distinct from an 
individual bank, and which may not be obvious at the microprudential level’ (see the reviews in 
Clement 2010; Galati & Moessner 2010).  
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be careful. [B]road definitions unnecessarily widen the objective to be pursued by 
supervisors and lessen accountability. […] Confusion about a policy may undermine its 
effectiveness’ (Caruana op. cit.).  
Despite these warnings, the scope of macroprudential policy expanded quickly. 
Macroprudential policy was given three tasks: boosting the resilience of the financial 
system by building buffers against systemic shocks; smoothing the financial cycle; and 
containing vulnerabilities arising from interconnectedness within the financial system 
and from institutions that are ‘too big to fail’ (FSB/IMF/BIS 2011; IMF 2013; 
IMF/FSB/BIS 2016; Constâncio 2016). It was, of course, still recognized that other 
policies could have an impact on financial stability. But instead of seeing financial 
stability as a shared responsibility, the IMF elevated macroprudential policy to a 
central position, with the macroprudential authority expected to ‘provide guidance’, 
demand ‘more forceful action’, or ‘correct biases’ in areas as diverse as financial 
regulation, bank resolution, and monetary, tax, competition, and housing policies 
(IMF 2013). Given how incomplete was our understanding of systemic risk, the 
financial cycle, and interconnectedness, this expansive view of macroprudential policy 
was nothing less than astonishing.  
At the same time, there was in most countries a substantial expansion in the 
responsibilities of central banks, which were given a key role in the framework for 
macroprudential policy. This was not surprising: central banks were well established, 
had considerable in-house resources and expertise, the independence to move quickly 
without—at least initially—having to worry too much about the political 
repercussions of their actions, and access to an international network. But this 
expansion in responsibilities meant that central banks were left to operate in 
unfamiliar and politically contentious territory, in charge of a policy that was still 
immature.  
It should be noted that not all central bankers were happy with this concentration of 
responsibilities in their hands. As Mervyn King, then Governor of the Bank of England, 
put it in 2013: ‘if central bankers are the only game in town, I am getting out of town!’2 
Their voices may have been prescient, but they were the exception. 
Today, at the end of the first post-crisis decade, and despite the substantial progress 
made, the framework for financial stability policy is still unsettled. Important 
foundational questions, like the definition of the financial stability goal, remain open. 
The preoccupation with the technical minutiae of macroprudential policy has made us 
lose sight of the bigger issues that must be addressed first. And the rush to put central 
banks on the front line without a proper debate about delegation, governance, and 
                                                 
2 Quoted in Tucker (2018) as Mervyn King’s response to Raghuram Rajan in the first Andrew Crockett 
Memorial Lecture at the BIS in June 2013. 
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accountability looks in retrospect like a mistake, given the increasing criticism they 
are coming under. This is the unfinished business in financial stability policy, and to 
this we turn next. 
Foundations of an effective financial stability policy framework 
Put simply, the key questions at the foundation of any policy framework are the what, 
who, and how: What is the goal? Who is responsible for delivering it? And how are 
they to pursue it and be held accountable for it? In light of the experience of the last 
decade and the current state of financial stability policy, all three questions need re-
assessing from first principles. The next three sections address in turn the goal, 
boundaries, and governance of financial stability policy. 
 
Goal 
Financial stability is defined negatively as the absence of instability. To be sure, the 
economic literature on financial instability and financial crises predates the global 
financial crisis. But in the pre-crisis period, the focus was on exchange rate or banking 
crises (Bordo 2017). Post-crisis, the definition of financial instability was broadened to 
include ‘any disruption to financial services caused by impairment of all or parts of the 
financial system that has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the 
real economy’ (CGFS 2010, FSB/IMF/BIS 2011, IMF 2013, IMF/FSB/BIS 2016). For the 
purposes of this definition, ‘financial services’ include credit intermediation, risk 
management, and payments services. Central to this definition is the concept of 
systemic risk, in other words, the probability that a shock could turn into a financial 
instability event.  
This definition of financial stability suffers from two major shortcomings.  
The first is that it lacks a sound theoretical basis. Almost anything could trigger a 
severe disruption to financial services: external shocks, excessive risk-taking, asset 
price volatility, housing booms, lax macroeconomic policies that lead to unsustainable 
public or private indebtedness, failure of systemically important financial institutions 
due to fraud or mismanagement, herd behavior among investors, a sudden shock to 
depositors’ confidence,… the list can go on and on, and the potential shocks could be 
either endogenous or exogenous to the financial system. But there is no 
comprehensive theory linking all these potential shocks to systemic risk through well-
understood transmission mechanisms. It is also not clear how systemic risk reacts to 
specific policy measures. 
In addition, structural, behavioral, and political economy factors, many outside the 
control of policy-makers, can have a major impact on financial stability. The direction 
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and magnitude of this impact is often ambiguous, depending on a host of other 
circumstances, and sometimes counterintuitive.  
 For example, one issue that has been extensively studied is the impact of 
competition in the banking system on financial stability. Intuitively, more 
competition, by putting pressure on profits, can be expected to lead banks to 
take more risk, thereby increasing systemic risk (Allen & Gale 2004). But it has 
also been argued that lower lending rates as a result of more competition 
improve borrowers’ viability, thus lowering credit risk (Boyd & De Nicolo 2005). 
The empirical evidence, to which economists would normally appeal to settle 
an issue like this, is inconclusive: there is large cross-country heterogeneity. It 
appears that the impact of competition on financial stability depends on several 
factors, including the level of institutional development, the quality of bank 
supervision, and the degree of leverage (see, among others, Delis 2012, Beck et 
al. 2013, Freixas & Ma 2014). On the face of this evidence, the OECD concluded 
that ‘studies exploring the complex interactions between competition and 
stability in retail and commercial banking come to the ambiguous conclusion 
that competition can be both good and bad for stability. Policy measures that 
strike an acceptable balance remain elusive.’ (OECD 2011).  
 
 Another structural issue that has an impact on financial stability is the quality 
of corporate governance in financial firms. Theoretical and empirical research 
shows that better corporate governance (in both financial and non-financial 
firms) is associated with lower stock price volatility, lower costs of borrowing, 
and deeper and more liquid capital markets. Weaknesses in corporate 
governance were major factors behind past financial crises in some emerging 
market economies. Intuitively, therefore, improving corporate governance 
should lower systemic risk. The findings of recent work by the IMF, however, 
are more nuanced. Stronger corporate governance does not necessarily reduce 
the probability of financial crises, although it appears to reduce their impact on 
the balance sheets of individual firms. Furthermore, the effect varies for 
different aspects of corporate governance (board independence and the quality 
of risk management are important; executive compensation much less so) and 
is state-dependent: a preponderance of large institutional shareholders—who 
are able to exercise tighter control over management than small individual 
shareholders—is associated with less risk-taking by individual firms in “normal” 
times but more risk-taking when the system is already in a period of stress 
(IMF 2014, 2016). 
 
 Financial deepening or financial development is a key goal for many developing 
and emerging market countries. However, its implications for financial stability 
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are not clear. On one hand, by facilitating risk diversification and creating 
deeper and more liquid financial markets, financial deepening can enhance 
stability. On the other, by promoting leverage and risk-taking beyond the point 
that a still-immature financial system can handle, it can have the opposite 
effect. Research by the IMF suggests that the relationship between financial 
deepening and financial stability is bell-shaped: at low levels, more financial 
deepening is associated with greater stability; but there is a certain point 
beyond which there ‘too much finance’ and additional financial deepening 
increases vulnerabilities (IMF 2015b). Possible explanations include the 
increased size and complexity of financial systems that could lead to a 
‘catastrophic meltdown’ (Rajan 2005) and the fact that, if some risks are 
unknown or poorly understood, herd behavior by investors can increase 
financial instability (Gennaioli, Schleifer & Vishny 2011). 
This discussion highlights that we still have no comprehensive theory or model for the 
behavior of the financial system, its interactions with the real economy, and its 
sensitivity to policies. And this makes achieving financial stability, however this goal is 
defined, very hard. 
The second major shortcoming of the standard IMF/FSB definition of financial 
stability is that it is not easy to translate financial stability into a practical, measurable 
operating target for policy. The closest candidate, containing systemic risk, is as 
nebulous as the notion of financial stability itself. Systemic risk is not directly 
observable. Although several metrics have been proposed, they are model-based 
estimates, not hard data. Contrast this with monetary policy: the operating target for 
price stability adopted in most countries—maintaining a single, well-defined 
aggregate price index close to a numerical target or within a specified range—is 
simple, clear, and measurable. Even when the numerical target is not explicit, as in the 
case of the U.S., everyone knows how price instability is measured, and this metric is 
regularly made publicly available by an independent authority. 
Having a vaguely defined goal that can be at best imperfectly approximated for a 
complex system whose workings are not fully understood raises daunting challenges 
for financial stability policy. How can we measure success? Since risk can never be 
fully eliminated, what is an acceptable degree of risk? How can the policy-maker’s (or 
society’s) risk tolerance be determined? How do we trade-off the benefit of avoiding a 
future tail event—a financial crisis—whose probability and economic impact are not 
known with any precision, against the cost of financial stability measures today? There 
are no good answers to these questions yet. 
Unfortunately, policy-makers in the real world cannot afford to wait until all these 
questions have been answered and they have the perfect policy framework at their 
disposal. For them, there are two practical ways forward. 
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 The first is to agree on a measure of systemic risk among the available model-
based estimates and articulate explicitly an arbitrary but transparent degree of 
‘risk tolerance’ of the policy authorities. This is not as far-fetched as it may 
sound. It is, in essence, the approach used by the U.S. Federal Reserve in 
designing the stress tests mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, which are a key 
component of the U.S. financial stability policy framework. The hypothetical 
stress scenarios are designed with specific numerical parameters measuring 
their severity,3 and banks that fail the tests are required to take corrective 
action. It should be possible to use a similar approach in defining a broader 
financial stability ‘standard’: when systemic risk is assessed to exceed this 
standard, policy action would be required. The pitfall of this approach—which 
also applies to the Federal Reserve’s design of stress tests—is that systemic risk 
has many dimensions, not all of which are known. A policy designed to 
maintain financial stability in the face of certain kinds of systemic risk does not 
guarantee that the financial system would be able to cope with all sources of 
systemic risk, and may thus lead to a false sense of security. 
 
 Another possible way forward is based on ideas developed outside the field of 
economics, specifically the notion of ‘discursive governance’ for independent 
regulatory agencies discussed in Gehring (2004). This approach starts by 
acknowledging that there is no practical financial stability metric and instead 
strives to establish a process of challenging the decisions of the financial 
stability policy authority, forcing it to explain its rationale and act upon the 
comments. This could be accomplished, for example, through regular scrutiny 
by the government, parliament, an independent council, or an international 
organization such as the IMF. The idea is that this process will, over time, help 
forge a consensus on the collective systemic risk tolerance, and thus the 
implicit operating target for financial stability policy. This is essentially the 
approach advocated by Large (2015). 
The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Until a good, comprehensive systemic 
risk proxy is broadly accepted, it would make sense to use the existing, imperfect 
metrics for at least some types of systemic risk, define thresholds for taking policy 
action, and hold the financial stability authority accountable for this action. At the 
same time, it would be important to complement this approach with a process of 
                                                 
3 In designing the ‘adverse’ and ‘severely adverse’ macroeconomic scenarios required by the Act, the 
Federal Reserve has adopted the so-called ‘recession approach’, in which the future paths of key 
economic variables in the scenarios are specified to reflect conditions that characterize post-war U.S. 
recessions. It has furthermore decided to use the unemployment rate as the central metric of the 
severity of the recession scenario, and has specified precise parametric changes (a 3 to 5 percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate or an increase to a minimum of 10 percent, whichever is 
greater, in 6-8 calendar quarters) to define the ‘severely adverse’ scenario (Federal Reserve, 2013). 
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challenge and dialogue that would help promote a better common understanding of 
the ultimate objective of financial stability policy, as well as broader acceptance of the 
cost of the measures necessary to achieve it. 
 
Boundaries 
The experience of the global financial crisis showed that traditional macroeconomic 
policies and microprudential regulation and supervision could not, by themselves, 
deliver financial stability. A new policy framework was needed, with financial stability 
as an explicit goal. But what would be the boundaries of this new framework? What 
policies and instruments should it encompass?  
The question was complicated by the fact that macroeconomic policies—especially lax 
monetary policies in the US during the ‘Great Moderation’—were widely seen as 
having contributed to the crisis. If so, shouldn’t monetary policy in the future be 
aimed at financial stability? And what about housing and other policies, like tax or 
competition, that had, to a greater or lesser extent, also played a role in the buildup of 
vulnerabilities that led to the crisis? 
Two answers have been proposed to this question.  
 The IMF, as we saw earlier, took the view that the financial stability goal should 
be assigned to macroprudential policy, while monetary and other policies 
should maintain their separate objectives. Recognizing, however, that these 
other policies can also have an impact on financial stability, the IMF elevated 
macroprudential policy to a central position, with the macroprudential 
authority—ideally, for the IMF, the central bank— expected to guide and, if 
necessary, demand adjustments in all other policies (IMF 2013).  
 
 The BIS, on the other hand, has continued to maintain that policy measures in 
the financial sector alone cannot deliver financial stability. Instead, (micro- and 
macro-) prudential regulation, monetary policy, and fiscal policy, in addition to 
pursuing their separate goals, should each be systematically aimed at stemming 
financial sector vulnerabilities in a coordinated way, in the context of an 
integrated ‘macro-financial policy framework’ (BIS 2016).  
Both answers are problematic. Assigning the goal of financial stability to 
macroprudential policy alone maintains an apparent ‘Tinbergen Rule’ simplicity; but 
elevating it to a central coordinating role is clearly unrealistic, given the lack of a well-
defined goal and the still-limited understanding of how—or whether—
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macroprudential  tools work.4 On the other hand, the notion of financial stability as a 
shared responsibility of several policies has some intuitive appeal; but it is not clear 
how an all-encompassing ‘macro-financial policy framework’ would actually work or 
how monetary and fiscal policies would resolve potential conflicts between the pursuit 
of financial stability and their other objectives. Moreover, as discussed in more detail 
below, the empirical literature has cast doubt on the feasibility and effectiveness of 
using monetary policy to pursue financial stability objectives.5 
What is needed is a systematic and rigorous approach to the question of the 
appropriate boundaries of the financial stability policy framework. Such an approach 
may be found outside the confines of economic literature. 
Political scientists studying policy design have developed three criteria for optimal 
‘policy mixes,’ i.e., bundles or portfolios of policies that pursue the same or related 
objectives (Howlett & Rayner 2007; Briassoulis 2009; Howlett & Cashore 2009; Rayner 
& Howlett 2009).6  
 Coherence, when different policy goals are intrinsically connected and co-exist 
in a logical fashion; 
  
 Consistency, when the instruments of different policies reinforce each other 
and contribute to the achievement of all the goals of the policy mix; and 
 
 Congruence, when multiple goals and instruments work together in a mutually 
supportive fashion most of the time and conflicts are unlikely and infrequent. 
These criteria can be used to determine the optimal boundaries of financial stability 
policy. Macroprudential is the only policy that has financial stability as its sole 
objective: it has no other competing goals. Policies that are coherent, consistent, and 
congruent with macroprudential policy should fall within the ambit of the financial 
stability policy framework: they should have financial stability as an explicit—though 
not necessarily the sole—objective and be pursued jointly. This does not necessarily 
require that authority for all of them should be vested in the same agency; but at a 
minimum, it requires that they be conducted in a coordinated fashion, since their 
                                                 
4 In a recent IMF paper, the authors note that ‘[d]espite considerable progress over the past years in 
assessing the effectiveness of macroprudential policies, many questions remain unanswered. In 
particular, the literature has so far not fully succeeded in rigorously quantifying the effects of various 
macroprudential measures’ (Alam et al. 2019). 
5 The BIS acknowledges this objection to an integrated macro-financial policy framework, noting that 
‘there is as yet no consensus on the balance of benefits and costs’ of using monetary policy to pursue 
financial stability objectives (BIS 2016). 
6 More recent contributions in the theory of policy design focusing on complex ‘policy packages’ have 
explored issues of governance, lobbying, and regulatory capture (Del Rio & Howlett 2013; Howlett & 
Rayner 2013), but the three optimality criteria remain relevant and adequate for the purposes of the 
discussion here. 
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combination is likely to deliver better results for their (coherent) objectives than the 
pursuit of each of them separately. On the other hand, policies that are not coherent, 
consistent, or congruent with macroprudential policy should maintain their distinct 
goals and be pursued independently of financial stability considerations.  
The rest of this section applies these criteria to a number of policies that have at 
different times been identified as potentially having an impact on financial stability—
in addition to macroprudential policy, which of course is coherent, consistent, and 
congruent with itself. Table 1 summarizes the results. 
Microprudential regulation and supervision  
Microprudential regulation and supervision is perhaps the most straightforward. Its 
goal—the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions—is not sufficient to 
ensure the stability of the financial system as a whole but is coherent and intrinsically 
linked with it: failure of the prudential supervision of individual systemically 
important institutions (or infrastructures) can precipitate a systemic crisis no matter 
how sophisticated the macroprudential framework is. In addition, given that 
macroprudential policy uses mostly microprudential instruments, the toolkit of the 
two policies is consistent. As anticipated by Crockett (2000), in using these 
instruments regulators should keep both micro- and macro- perspectives in mind. 
Lastly, the two policies are congruent: they are most effective when implemented in 
close coordination. Tensions may arise under very specific circumstances: for example, 
Coherence Consistency Congruence
Macroprudential policy
Microprudential regulation 
& supervision
Yes Yes Yes
Financial safety nets Yes Yes Yes
Monetary policy No Sometimes Sometimes
Fiscal policy No No Sometimes
Competition policy No No No
Housing policy No No No
Optimality criteria
Table 1. Scope of the Financial Stability Policy Framework
Policies
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at the onset of a crisis, when microprudential supervisors may ask individual 
institutions to reduce risk exposures by deleveraging while, at the same time, 
macroprudential policy-makers may be taking steps (e.g., reducing countercyclical 
capital buffers) to ensure continued flow of credit to the real economy. But these 
tensions are infrequent and, assuming effective coordination arrangements, relatively 
easy to resolve. 
Financial safety nets 
This term encompasses a wide range of arrangements, rules, and institutions aimed at 
containing the impact of a systemic crisis and minimizing the costs to the economy 
and to taxpayers. They include structural rules separating—or introducing firewalls 
between—different types of banking activities, like the Volcker rule in the U.S. or the 
recommendations of the Vickers Commission in the U.K.; arrangements for the 
recovery or resolution of failing (‘going concern’) or failed (‘gone concern’) banks and 
other financial entities; deposit insurance; emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) 
arrangements; and arrangements for inter-agency cooperation in the event of a 
systemic crisis.7 Although many of these pertain to the period after the onset of a 
financial crisis, their goals are coherent with macroprudential policy because putting 
credible financial safety nets in place before a crisis can lower systemic risk.  
The various safety nets are also consistent and congruent with macroprudential policy 
and reinforce measures aimed at reducing systemic risk. This was powerfully 
illustrated by the arguments underpinning the Bank of England’s post-crisis capital 
framework for banks. The total amount of capital the Bank considered appropriate for 
the banking system as a whole (around 11 percent of risk-weighted assets) was 
deliberately set lower than other estimates—notably those made by the Basel 
Committee in the aftermath of the crisis—because ‘effective arrangements for 
resolving banks’ and ‘other structural changes since the crisis,’ including the ring-
fencing of major UK banks, ‘reduce both the probability of crisis and the economic 
cost of bank failure’ (Bank of England 2015). The Bank of England clearly considers 
that these safety nets contribute directly to financial stability. 
Monetary policy 
Given the evident—at least with the benefit of post-crisis hindsight—potential of 
monetary policy to create or amplify financial sector vulnerabilities, the pre-crisis 
consensus that it should stay exclusively focused on price stability came into question. 
During the last decade, a growing body of research has started exploring the benefits 
                                                 
7 The term ‘financial safety nets’ is used here for the first time with such a wide scope. The term was 
used in a similar context in IMF (2009), but its scope in that paper was much more limited (mainly to 
the resolution regime and deposit insurance). 
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and costs of using monetary policy—specifically, the short-term interest rate—for 
financial stability goals.  
It is true that the short-term interest rate operates through the same channels as 
several prudential policy instruments, notably capital requirements (Cecchetti & 
Kohler 2014), so it could, in principle, be used to achieve either monetary policy or 
financial stability objectives. It is also true, as the BIS and others have pointed out 
(IMF 2015a, Borio 2016), that a monetary policy of ‘leaning against the wind’ in good 
times, i.e., keeping interest rates higher than would be justified purely on price 
stability grounds, could help mitigate financial stability risks. These arguments, 
however, still leave open the question which policy can be more effective in achieving 
each of the objectives: in other words, which policy could achieve either objective at 
the lowest cost for the real economy.  
While this question is not settled, the weight of empirical evidence suggests that that 
monetary policy would make a poor and inconsistent financial stability tool (see also 
the survey in Aikman et al. 2018a). 
 After reviewing the literature, the IMF found that while a policy of ‘leaning 
against the wind’ can indeed lower systemic risk, macroprudential policy action 
is generally more effective, and concluded that, given the limited 
understanding of systemic risk and the transmission channels of various 
policies, monetary policy should ‘generally’ not deviate from the objective of 
price stability (IMF 2015a). This was confirmed in a paper by Fahr & Fell (2017), 
who found that monetary policy is relatively more effective in ensuring price 
stability than in mitigating systemic risk, while conversely, macroprudential 
policy aimed at moderating the financial cycle is relatively more effective in 
ensuring financial stability compared to the short-term interest rate. Blanchard 
& Summers (2017) also concluded that using monetary policy to fight asset 
bubbles ‘has a good chance of being ineffective and possibly counterproductive’ 
as the interest rate is a poor instrument for decreasing risk and suffers from 
long transmission lags.  
 
 In a Federal Reserve Board paper (Ajello et al. 2016) estimated the economic 
costs of using interest rates to reduce vulnerabilities in the financial system and 
concluded that they are large relative to the benefits. Svennson (2017) argued 
that these costs are likely to be higher still, given that this policy would make 
the economy weaker at the onset of a crisis, thus worsening its severity.  
 
 Aikman et al. 2018b analyzed empirically the joint non-linear dynamics of 
credit, financial conditions, and monetary policy and found that the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy to longer-term yields is blunted in 
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high-credit states. This suggests that, regardless of the costs of doing so, the 
effect of using the short-term interest rate to ‘lean against the wind’ is state-
contingent: this policy may not work at all in high-credit states of the world.  
Against this background, how would the three optimality criteria apply to monetary 
policy? The goal of price stability does not appear to be intrinsically linked to financial 
stability: achieving one does not necessarily deliver the other, and many crises—
including the global financial crisis—have erupted in an environment of price stability. 
In addition, pursuing price stability through monetary stimulus in a deflationary or 
near-deflationary environment may actually undermine financial stability by 
encouraging excessive risk-taking. As recent experience shows, this tension is not easy 
to resolve. Finally, although the short-term interest rate can in principle by used to 
mitigate systemic risk, the empirical evidence suggests that this is neither efficient nor 
always effective, raising questions about consistency and congruence.  
Fiscal and other policies 
Fiscal policy has multiple dimensions beyond aggregate demand management, 
including tax efficiency, distributional fairness, and other long-term goals that are far 
removed from systemic risk. However, even the relatively narrow goal of managing 
aggregate demand in order to close the output gap and achieve full employment is not 
intrinsically linked to systemic risk or the stability of the financial sector. Some fiscal 
policy instruments—notably taxation—can, under certain circumstances, be 
congruent with financial stability objectives, for example, by helping deflate asset 
bubbles in certain sectors, like housing. The reverse could, in theory, also be true: 
macroprudential policies aimed at smoothing the financial cycle could support 
countercyclical fiscal policies. But this could only happen when the financial and 
business cycles are synchronized. Moreover, given our still-limited understanding of 
macroprudential tools, there is no evidence that this mutually-reinforcing effect would 
be significant. On the other hand, if the financial and business cycles are not 
synchronized or if fiscal policy is at least partly driven by broader goals—as is often 
the case in the real world—conflicts between fiscal and macroprudential policies 
would be likely to arise and, given the deep differences in the governance 
arrangements for each, hard to resolve. 
The farther we move from the financial sector the harder it is to make the case that 
policies such as competition and housing are coherent, consistent, and congruent with 
macroprudential policy. Of course, this is not to ignore the potential impact these 
policies could have on financial stability: policies will always have spillover effects on 
other areas. But this does not require that they be subsumed into a common policy 
framework. 
14 
The optimal boundaries of financial stability policy   
In conclusion, the analysis shows that macroprudential policy, microprudential 
supervision, and financial safety nets meet the criteria for an integrated policy 
portfolio or framework. They have different objectives (containing systemic risk, 
maintaining the safety and soundness of individual institutions, ensuring orderly 
least-cost resolution of financial entities, protecting small depositors, limiting moral 
hazard, or safeguarding the interests of taxpayers) but these are intrinsically 
connected and coherent with each other and with the ultimate goal of financial 
stability. Their instruments are consistent (in some cases, overlapping) and may, to 
some extent, be used interchangeably. And each of them contributes to, or at least 
does not detract from, achieving the goals of the others. Financial stability can really 
be thought of as a shared responsibility of these three policies. 
Large (2015) outlined a similar proposal for a framework with three pillars: 
macroprudential policy, microprudential supervision, and recovery and resolution. 
The scope of his framework is very similar to ours, except for the third pillar, which is 
narrower in scope. But his proposal was not sufficiently fleshed out, there was no 
rationale tying the three pillars together, and no explanation for why the boundaries 
were drawn that way. 
While a number of other economic policies can have a direct or indirect impact on 
financial stability, it seems reasonable to limit the scope of financial stability policy to 
these three components. These can be most effective in mitigating systemic risk. And 
while it is important to understand and monitor the effects of other policies on 
financial stability, it is generally better to let them focus on their own objectives and 
use the three pillars of financial stability policy to offset these effects, if necessary. 
 
Governance 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, countries overhauled not only their 
financial regulations but also their regulatory institutional architecture. Unlike the 
former, where reforms were coordinated and monitored by the Financial Stability 
Board, the changes to the institutional architecture differed markedly from country to 
country (IMF 2013, Lim et al. 2013). To this day, there is no single ‘best’ model for the 
institutional architecture of financial stability policy (CGFS 2010, BIS 2011, 
IMF/FSB/BIS 2016).  
Nevertheless, as we saw, in almost all countries these institutional changes resulted as 
a matter of fact in more powers being given to the central bank. This was 
enthusiastically championed by the IMF. Laying out the first ‘key principles for 
macroprudential policy,’ the Fund stressed that to ensure the macroprudential 
authority’s willingness and ability to act, the central bank should ‘play a key role’ 
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regardless of the specific institutional arrangements (IMF 2013). Indeed, the Fund 
went further than that: in two of the three ‘institutional models for macroprudential 
policy-making’ it outlined in the same paper, authority for macroprudential policy 
rests with the central bank. As regards the third one, in which macroprudential 
authority rests with a committee outside the central bank, the Fund recommended 
that this committee be chaired by the central bank. And if the committee were chaired 
by another agency, notably the Treasury, the Fund cautioned that, in order to 
‘safeguard the independence of the participating agencies’ (notably the central bank), 
this committee should not be given hard powers (IMF op. cit. pp. 29-30).  
Central banks had by then secured a zealously-guarded and much-vaunted 
‘independence’—meaning independence from the government—in the conduct of 
monetary policy. The consensus among economists was that an independent central 
bank, focused on a (usually explicit) inflation target, was the best institutional 
arrangement for delivering price stability (Cukierman 2008).8 It therefore followed 
that the central bank should enjoy the same degree of independence in the discharge 
of the new responsibilities assigned to it. This unspoken assumption explains the 
IMF’s preoccupation that the architecture of macroprudential policy should above all 
preserve the independence of the central bank: after all, if central bank independence 
is an unalloyed good for price stability, it would be the same for financial stability. 
This assumption is wrong. First, as Bean (2017) has pointed out, central bank 
independence is a bit of fiction: central banks are ultimately creatures of the state, and 
their powers come from (and can be taken away by) the state.9 Rather than talk about 
central bank independence in the abstract, it is more helpful to think in terms of 
specific tasks that are delegated by the state to the central bank, and the precise 
principal-agent arrangements that are appropriate for each task. Second, and more 
important, financial stability is fundamentally different than price stability—as the 
discussion in the preceding sections has made clear. Even if the central bank were to 
be given sole responsibility for financial stability, it does not follow that it should have 
the same degree of independence as it does for monetary policy.  
Before we can decide the role of the central bank, there is a more fundamental 
question that needs to be addressed: should the responsibility for financial stability be 
delegated to an independent agency—such as the central bank—or should it stay with 
the government? And if the former, what degree of delegation is appropriate?  
                                                 
8 Whether this would also automatically lead to closing the output gap and full employment or that 
requires a ‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard & Gali 2005) is a separate discussion, outside the scope of this 
paper. 
9 The one possible exception is the European Central Bank, whose powers derive from an international 
treaty. 
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Economic theory provides the tools to address this question. In their now-classic 
investigation of the delegation of policy tasks from politicians to technocratic agencies 
at arm’s length from the government, Alesina and Tabellini outlined four principles of 
delegation (Alesina & Tabellini 2007, 2008). A policy task should be delegated to a 
technocratic agency if: 
1. The task is such that politicians cannot make a credible commitment to fulfill it 
(due to time inconsistency, short-termism, or the influence of strong vested 
interests with stakes in the outcome). 
2. The policy goal—and thus the criteria of good performance—can be specified 
ex ante. 
3. Social preferences around the policy goal are reasonably stable. 
4. The policy does not have far-reaching distributional consequences. 
If, on the other hand, these conditions are not met, the policy task should remain with 
the government, who will be held accountable at the ballot box. 
Despite some disagreement, especially as regards the distributional consequences of 
monetary policy in a world of persistently low interest rates and large-scale asset 
purchases, the consensus has so far been that monetary policy meets these criteria and 
should therefore be delegated to an agency—the central bank—that is independent 
from the government.  
Financial stability policy, however, is another story. It arguably meets the first of the 
four criteria for delegation: time inconsistent preferences are likely to make credible 
commitment of politicians to financial stability extremely challenging. But it fails the 
other three criteria. The goal of financial stability policy is, as we have seen, vague and 
non-observable, so it is not possible to define ex ante criteria of success. Social 
preferences for financial stability—or the degree of tolerance for the risk of financial 
instability—are not well-defined and unlikely to be stable. It is therefore difficult for a 
technocratic agency to optimize the trade-offs between a vague and non-observable 
benefit in the future and the very visible cost of measures to contain systemic risk 
today: it will inevitably be seen as imposing its own preferences on society. And many 
of the measures to contain systemic risk, such as limits on high loan-to-value 
mortgage loans, have significant distributional consequences.  
A different governance model is needed for financial stability policy: one that 
addresses the time inconsistency problem but also distinguishes between ‘political’ 
and ‘technical’ decisions. Not all decisions pertaining to financial stability can—or 
should—be taken at the same level. Some, such as defining the objective, determining 
the level of systemic risk tolerance, establishing accountability and inter-agency 
cooperation arrangements, and designing the institutional architecture itself, are 
decisions that should be made at a level above the designated agency. These decisions 
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are fundamentally political and should be the product of the political process in each 
country (Large 2015, Tucker 2016a, 2016b, 2018). Once these issues are settled, the 
responsibility to achieve the established objective may be delegated to the agency or 
agencies responsible for financial stability policy, together with the power, 
independence, and resources necessary to carry out this task effectively. 
This means that the concept of independence needs to be ‘unpacked’ in order to 
determine the appropriate degree of delegation. Independence is multi-layered, 
encompassing political independence (no interference by the government), goal 
independence (the authority of the agency to set its own policy goal, e.g., the central 
bank setting the inflation goal), and operational independence (the ability to select 
and use policy instruments with autonomy).10  
Based on this distinction, Balls et al. (2018) have suggested that while the agency(ies) 
responsible for systemic risk monitoring and macroprudential policy should enjoy 
operational independence, they should be subject to an additional layer of political 
oversight, in order to ensure political legitimacy. The next section takes this 
suggestion a step further and presents a governance model that distinguishes between 
the ‘political’ and ‘technical’ levels of financial stability policy-making for each of the 
three core components of the framework discussed in the previous section. 
A high-level governance model for financial stability policy 
Table 2 outlines a governance model for financial stability. The three columns are the 
three components of financial stability policy: macroprudential policy, 
microprudential supervision, and financial safety nets. The four rows cover four key 
aspects of policy development that apply to any kind of policy (design, prerequisites, 
analytics, and operations/implementation) and distinguishes between aspects that are 
determined at the ‘political’ level (i.e., at a level above that of the agency(ies) tasked 
with carrying out the policy) and the ‘technical’ level (i.e., the level of the agency). 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, even in the case of monetary policy, the few empirical investigations that have tried to 
distinguish between these various layers found that instrument/operational independence is key for 
price stability, while political/goal independence does not matter (see, for example, Debelle & Fischer 
1994, Balls et al. 2018). 
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 The first row covers fundamental questions of policy design: the definition of 
the basic elements of the framework (such as the objective of financial stability 
policy, the degree of risk appetite, the degree and means of protection of 
taxpayer money in resolution, the extent of coverage of deposit insurance, etc.); 
the institutional architecture (the agencies and their respective responsibilities, 
their hierarchy, the degree of independence they are granted, the 
accountability arrangements, etc.); as well as any international commitments 
made in the context of financial stability objectives (such as burden-sharing 
arrangements). These fundamental questions cut across all three components 
of financial stability policy. They should not—indeed in most cases cannot—be 
delegated to technocrats in independent agencies but should be decided at the 
political level, by elected politicians at the parliament or in government. To 
have legitimacy, they should reflect to the highest possible degree broadly 
accepted social choices. 
 
 The second row covers the prerequisites for successful policy implementation. 
These are the necessary conditions that would enable the agencies tasked with 
various components of financial stability policy to carry out their tasks 
effectively: operational independence, legal protections, adequate budgetary 
and human resources, etc. Despite differences in the details, these prerequisites 
also apply to all three components of financial stability policy. Because of their 
nature, ensuring most of these prerequisites requires action at the political 
level. For example, granting legal protection to supervisors in the conduct of 
their duties in accordance to the legal regime of each country, or providing 
budgetary resources (or a Treasury backstop) for the operations of the 
agency(ies) in charge of financial stability, can only be done at the level of the 
legislature. 
 
 The third row covers the analytical underpinnings of each of the three 
components of financial stability policy. Each of these components requires 
extensive investment in analytical techniques, both to identify potential sources 
of systemic risk and to mitigate it. Most of the emphasis in recent years has  
been on developing analytical tools for systemic risk monitoring, such as 
system-wide stress tests, network models, analysis of spillovers and 
interconnectedness, etc. But both microprudential supervision and financial 
safety nets also use analytical tools of the type highlighted in the respective 
columns in Table 2. Indeed, as the financial sector—and our understanding of 
it—evolves, these tools need constant extension and refinement. These 
elements are delegated to the level of the agency. 
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 The fourth row covers operational aspects of policy implementation. For 
macroprudential policy, this includes developing and calibrating a toolkit, 
triggers for policy action, criteria for designating systemically important 
financial firms, etc. For microprudential supervision, it includes developing and 
refining the supervisory approach (e.g., risk- or compliance-based, market- or 
firm-based); the toolkit used for supervision (off-site monitoring, on-site 
inspections, trend or outlier analysis, benchmarking, etc.); the machinery for 
assessing compliance, punishing non-compliance, and the process of appeals 
against supervisory decisions and adjudication; etc. For financial safety nets, 
key operational issues include the design of normal and emergency liquidity 
facilities; the implementation of ring-fencing, if relevant; the resolvability of 
financial firms; funding arrangements for deposit insurance, etc. For all three 
policy areas, two critical operational aspects are functioning information-
sharing and cooperation arrangements, both cross-agency and cross-border 
(such as Memoranda of Understanding); and a well-developed communications 
policy, both with the industry and with the public. Most of the elements in this 
row may be delegated to the technical level, but with political oversight over 
the menu of tools the agency(ies) may use, especially if these have significant 
distributional consequences. 
The elements listed above are not an exhaustive list of tasks for the financial stability 
policy-maker. They serve as an illustration of what each aspect of policy is supposed to 
cover. The contents of each cell in Table 2 will also be different from country to 
country, reflecting the characteristics of its financial system. For example, the 
analytical and operational aspects of policy would look very different in a small, 
emerging marker country with a relatively closed bank-dominated financial system 
and in an advanced economy with a complex and globally interconnected system. 
Nevertheless, the three components of financial stability policy and the four aspects of 
policy development apply to all cases. The model covers all relevant elements of 
financial stability policy but is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a wide variety of 
country circumstances. 
Institutional architecture 
Based on this governance model, what agency or agencies should be given the 
responsibility (as well as the authority, autonomy, and resources) for the analytical 
and operational aspects of financial stability policy? 
The central bank already has a major presence in that space and, clearly, a key role to 
play. It has a comparative advantage in systemic risk monitoring and risk analytics for 
the financial sector (stress tests, network modeling); access to data and the 
infrastructure to use them; and in most cases, well-developed in-house expertise. It is 
responsible for several aspects of the financial safety nets. And in countries where it is 
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also in charge of the microprudential oversight of (at least parts of) the financial 
sector, it has direct control over instruments that can be used for macroprudential 
purposes. Especially in the latter case, it is thus tempting to assign overall 
responsibility for financial stability to the central bank. 
But usually there are other agencies involved in various components of the financial 
stability framework, such as the capital markets supervisor, insurance supervisor, or 
the deposit insurance agency, and their operational independence is equally 
important. The Treasury should also be directly involved in decisions that may have 
implications or create financial risks for the taxpayer. And the government, through 
the Treasury, should retain overall political oversight—and accountability—for major 
financial stability policy decisions, including the foundational aspects of design and 
prerequisites from Table 2. 
Therefore, some sort of committee is necessary to guide financial stability policy. 
Given the need for high-level political oversight, the Treasury is probably best placed 
to chair this committee, although the UK model, with a separate Financial Policy 
Committee at the central bank, whose powers and tools are subject to political 
oversight, also works well. And just as political oversight and accountability are 
important for the legitimacy of the committee, so is the operational independence of 
each participating agency, as well as the cooperation among them, for its effectiveness.  
Beyond these general principles, however, there is no recipe for an ‘optimal’ 
institutional architecture and assignment of agency responsibilities. In every country, 
the mandate, powers, and governance of the central bank and various financial sector 
supervisory agencies are state- and history-contingent. In other words, how well an 
agency functions in a particular country depends on this country’s circumstances 
(political system, political culture and traditions, institutional arrangements for other 
policies, etc.), as well as on the past (previous episodes of financial instability, what 
were seen as the failures that led to them, and the policy reactions of the authorities). 
As well, institutions evolve slowly and are subject to historical path dependence: past 
institution-shaping decisions constrain and influence the choices that are available 
when reforms become necessary. And reforms to the financial stability policy 
architecture, such as the ones that took place after the global financial crisis, are not 
implemented in a vacuum but in the context of the existing institutional setup in each 
country. For all these reasons, it is likely that there will continue to be a diversity of 
institutional arrangements for financial stability policy around the world. 
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Concluding observations 
The last decade saw an unprecedented wave of reforms aimed at covering the fault 
lines exposed by the global financial crisis. Importantly, these reforms included steps 
to build a new macroprudential policy framework dedicated to financial stability that 
would complement the existing arsenal of macroeconomic and microprudential 
policies. 
Despite the substantial progress, establishing this new policy framework proved 
challenging. Fundamental questions about the ultimate goal of financial stability, the 
role of other policies in achieving it, and their relationship with macroprudential 
policy remain unsettled. These questions deserved more attention at the outset, but 
they were sidelined by the excessive focus on macroprudential policy. It has also by 
now become clear that the institutional architecture of the new framework and, in 
particular, the role of central banks, has not been thought out properly. The rush to 
assign increased responsibilities for financial stability to the central banks, combined 
with what appeared to be a preoccupation with preserving maximum independence at 
all costs, prevented a proper discussion on the right degree of delegation of the new 
policy functions. That this took place at the same time as central banks were 
expanding into unorthodox monetary policy triggered an inevitable backlash against 
their powers and perceived lack of accountability. 
The central thesis of this paper is that to complete the unfinished business in financial 
stability policy, we need to address some foundational issues by going back to first 
principles. We need to put our focus on financial stability, not just macroprudential 
policy. We need to provide a definition of the goal and to determine a range of 
policies, including macroprudential, that may be used to achieve it. Within the 
boundaries of financial stability policy, we should acknowledge that macroprudential 
policy is still work in progress: while technical work is of paramount importance and 
should continue, especially in the areas of systemic risk assessment and tool 
calibration, in several other areas we should be open to learning from the wide range 
of country experiences. Last but not least, we need to recognize that, regardless of the 
particular institutional arrangements in each country, articulating and defining the 
goal of financial stability and deciding on any trade-offs that may arise between this 
and other policy goals is the task of democratically accountable governments, not 
unelected bureaucrats. The agency(ies) in charge of the various components of 
financial stability policy should have operational independence but be subject to 
political oversight and be held accountable for their actions.  
It would be tempting to think that once we address these issues and put in place a 
governance framework like the one presented in this paper, financial stability would 
be assured. Unfortunately, this is not so. There are still considerable gaps in our 
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understanding of the financial system. Structural factors, collective behaviors, and 
incentives of economic agents may have as much impact on financial stability as 
policies, and this impact is not well understood. As a result, no matter how sound the 
framework, how advanced the analytics, and how sophisticated, resourceful, and 
committed the policy authorities, financial stability is a goal that will remain elusive 
for some time to come. It will thus be important to remain aware of the limitations of 
financial stability policy, manage expectations of what it can deliver, and continue to 
expand the frontier of our understanding of the functioning of the financial system. 
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